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Reviewing the evidence on the innovation impact of the 
EU Emission Trading System  
 
Karoline S. Rogge  
 
SPRU – Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9SL, UK 
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research (Fraunhofer ISI), Karlsruhe, Germany 
 
Abstract: 
 
The Paris Climate Agreement calls for decarbonization of the economy in the second 
half of this century. This requires a radical redirection and acceleration of technological 
change towards low- and particularly zero-carbon solutions. Global carbon pricing is 
seen as a key enabler for such decarbonization, with the European Union’s Emission 
Trading System (EU ETS) serving as an important pillar. In this paper, I therefore re-
view the evidence on the innovation impact of the EU ETS. The review shows a very 
limited effect of the scheme on technological innovation, but there are clear signs of it 
having stimulated organizational innovation, with the impact being more pronounced 
for the electricity sector than for industry. The initially high expectations of the EU ETS 
regarding technological innovation largely dissipated once the scheme’s lack of strin-
gency became apparent and prices collapsed accordingly. Also, for many of the rather 
incremental innovations that have taken place, the EU ETS was shown to be only one 
contributing factor among others, with the broader policy mix and long-term targets 
playing a particularly pivotal role in stimulating innovation. In contrast, there is clear 
evidence that the EU ETS has been a key driver of various organizational innovations, 
including making climate change a top management issue. However, so far, these or-
ganizational innovations have only had limited effects on shifting corporate strategies 
towards low-carbon solutions because of low carbon prices, the relatively high share of 
free allocations in industry, and more pressing business concerns. Despite this, the 
scheme’s positive impact on organizational innovations should not be underestimated, 
as these constitute a necessary precondition for future technological innovations. The 
findings suggest that the Commission’s proposal for the fourth trading period of the EU 
ETS points in the right direction, but further efforts will be needed to significantly in-
crease the scarcity of EU allowances and the share of auctioning in order to fully un-
leash the scheme’s transformative power. If the identified shortcomings are not ad-
dressed, the EU ETS cannot play its foreseen role in guiding the decarbonization of the 
European economy, for which innovations in low-carbon solutions are a fundamental 
requirement.  
 
JEL: O31, O38, Q54, Q55, Q58 
Keywords: innovation, emission trading, EU ETS, climate policy, policy mix 
 
A revised version of this paper will appear as a book chapter in: 
Weishaar, S.E. (2016), Research Handbook on Emissions Trading, Environmental Law 
Series, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar (forthcoming).  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
At the international climate conference in Paris in December 2015 the political leaders 
of the world agreed to hold the global average temperature increase well below 2°C and 
to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C.1 Translated into global 
greenhouse gas emissions this implies that these should peak as soon as possible and 
thereafter be rapidly reduced so as to achieve the decarbonization of the economy in the 
second half of this century. This massive transformation calls for a radical redirection 
and acceleration of technological change towards low- and particularly zero-carbon so-
lutions, which in turn necessitates policies inducing such changes. Global carbon priz-
ing is seen as a key enabler for such a decarbonisation of the economy, and the Europe-
an Union’s Emission Trading System (EU ETS) as the world’s largest and first multi-
country greenhouse gas emission trading system may serve as pilot and starting point 
for implementing such carbon prizing. Therefore, in this chapter I review the empirical 
evidence on the innovation impact of the EU ETS, based on which I discuss the role 
such a cap-and-trade instrument can play in achieving a radical transformation towards 
a decarbonized economy. 
 
Under the EU ETS, a certain absolute number of greenhouse gas emission allowances 
(EUAs) are allocated per year, where one EUA gives the right to emit one ton of CO2e.2 
Operators can trade these EUAs at the market, and have to surrender the number of al-
lowances equivalent to the amount of CO2 emissions caused by their installations during 
the previous year. Ideally, such a cap-and-trade approach ensures that emissions are 
reduced where it is cheapest to do so, and that the market price for EUAs reflects the 
scarcity of allowances in the system. Eventually, the market mechanism ensures that all 
participants face the same marginal abatement costs so that overall reduction costs are 
minimized (static efficiency).  
 
In addition, the EUA price also sets monetary incentives to adopt new technologies or 
implement new processes with lower emissions and to invest in research and develop-
ment (R&D) in low-carbon technologies (dynamic efficiency). This direct innovation 
impact can be differentiated into the effect occurring at EU ETS firms and the one rele-
vant for other actors conducting R&D on low-carbon technologies, such as technology 
providers, universities or research institutes. If the additional costs for CO2 emissions 
are passed on and included in the product prices of EU ETS firms, emission trading may 
also induce indirect innovation effects on the demand side where those products are 
used as inputs. However, in this chapter I focus on the scheme’s direct impact on inno-
vation. 
 
Focusing on the impact of the EU ETS on low-carbon innovation is particularly well 
justified in the context of long-term transformative change such as the envisioned de-
carbonization of the economy. Indeed, environmentally-friendly technological innova-
                                                     
1  See UNFCCC, Paris Agreement 2015. 
2  Carbon dioxide equivalent. For simplicity in the remainder of the chapter I will simply refer to CO2. 
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tion has already early on been identified as "perhaps the single most important criterion 
on which to judge environmental policies” in the long haul.3 In addition, the EU Com-
mission states as one of the major goals of the EU ETS the promotion of global innova-
tion to act against climate change.4 It is therefore of utmost importance for policy eval-
uation studies to judge the EU ETS against this criteria.  
 
Yet, judging the impact of the EU ETS on innovation is no straightforward exercise, as 
innovation is a complex and systemic phenomenon.5 Given the difficulties involved in 
measuring innovation as dynamic, interactive and uncertain process it may not come as 
a surprise that studies evaluating the innovation impact of a single instrument typically 
follow a rather linear understanding of the innovation process – often separating it in the 
three stages of invention, innovation and diffusion, or into innovation and diffusion.6 As 
is done in other context, studies on the innovation impact of the EU ETS utilize differ-
ent input- and output-based indicators of the innovation process, such as expenditures 
for research and development (R&D), innovation activities, patents, or innovations. 
Both quantitative and qualitative as well as mixed method research designs are applied 
for studying the innovation impact of the EU ETS, including econometric analysis of 
patent data, regression analysis of company survey data, case study analysis based on 
interviews with company representatives, and expert interviews. 
 
In this chapter, I follow the OECD Oslo Manual in defining innovation as “the imple-
mentation of a new or significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a 
new marketing method, or a new organizational method in business practices, work-
place organization or external relations”. 7 Given the chapter’s focus on the EU ETS 
and climate change mitigation, I investigate findings on the impact of the EU ETS on 
low-carbon innovations which reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In the context of this 
chapter I further differentiate these into low-carbon technological and organizational 
innovation. The former covers both low-carbon product and process innovations, such 
as significant improvements in technical specifications, components and materials, or 
other functional characteristics, and in production and delivery methods. The latter re-
fers to the implementation of new organizational methods, such as changes in business 
practices and in workplace organization which may facilitate the reduction of green-
house gas emissions.  
 
                                                     
3  See A V. Kneese and CL Schultz, Pollution, Prices and Public Policy (Brookings Institute 1978). 
4  See European Commission, ‘EU Action against Climate Change: EU Emissions Trading — an Open 
Scheme Promoting Global Innovation’ (2005). 
5  See Jan Fagerberg, DC Mowery and RR Nelson, The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (Oxford 
University Press 2005). 
6  See JA Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Harper and Brothers 1942). 
7  See p. 46 in OECD and Eurostat, ‘Oslo Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting 
Innovation Data’ (3rd edn, OECD and Eurostat 2005). 
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Before presenting the results of existing studies on the innovation impact of the EU 
ETS, in section II I will first provide an overview of the expected innovation impact of 
the EU ETS. In section III I will examine the empirical evidence of the impact of the 
EU ETS on technological innovation, and in doing so will differentiate between its three 
trading phases (2005-2007, 2008-12, 2013-2020). In section IV I will then present the 
findings on the scheme’s impact on organizational innovation. In section V I conclude 
the chapter with some final observations on the innovation impact of the EU ETS as one 
instrument in the climate policy mix. I also offer some methodological recommenda-
tions for future studies and suggest implications for policy makers interested in the de-
carbonization of the economy. 
 
 
II EXPECTED INNOVATION IMPACT 
 
Economists have long argued for the superiority of market-based instruments, such as 
the EU ETS, in terms of cost efficiency and their continued provision of innovation in-
centives.8 In addition to these theoretical claims the empirical literature examining mar-
ket-based environmental policies has delivered important insights into actual innovation 
incentives by studying the first applications of permit trading in the United States for 
pollutants such as SO2, NOx, and lead.9 Building on the theoretical environmental eco-
nomics literature10 and empirical evidence from US trading schemes11, the innovation 
impact of the EU ETS was expected to be rather low, at least in its first phase.12 In addi-
tion, some early studies have estimated the potential innovation impact of the EU ETS 
by identifying design features that could be important in determining this effect.13  
 
                                                     
8  See William J Baumol and Wallace E Oates, The Theory of Environmental Policy (Cambridge 
University Press 1988); T Requate, ‘Dynamic Incentives by Environmental Policy Instruments - a 
Survey’ (2005) 54 Ecological Economics 175. 
9  For an overview, see B Hansjürgens, Emissions Trading for Climate Policy - U.S. and European 
Perspectives (Cambridge University Press 2006). 
10  See, for example, Carolyn Fischer, Ian WH Parry and William A Pizer, ‘Instrument Choice for 
Environmental Protection When Technological Innovation Is Endogenous’ (2003) 45 Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 523; CH Jung, K Krutilla and R Boyd, ‘Incentives for 
Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy 
Alternatives’ (1996) 30 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 95; DA Malueg, 
‘Emission Credit Trading and the Incentive to Adopt New Pollution-Abatement Technology’ (1989) 
16 Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 52. 
11  See, for example, S Kerr and RG Newell, ‘Policy-Induced Technology Adoption: Evidence from the 
US Lead Phasedown’ (2003) 51 Journal of Industrial Economics 317; David Popp, ‘Pollution 
Control Innovations and the Clean Air Act of 1990.’ (2003) 22 Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 641. 
12  See Frank Gagelmann and Manuel Frondel, ‘The Impact of Emission Trading on Innovation – 
Science Fiction or Reality?’ (2005) 15 European Environment 203. 
13  See F Gagelmann and B Hansjürgens, ‘Climate Protection through Tradable Permits: The EU 
Proposal for a CO2 Emissions Trading System in Europe’ (2002) 12 European Environment 185. 
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This attention to the scheme’s design features rests on the increasing recognition that 
rather than the instrument type what seems to be more influential for innovation are its 
design features,14 such as its stringency,15 predictability16 or flexibility17. These design 
features have been analyzed in detail, e.g. for the pilot phase of the EU ETS from 2005-
2007 and for its second trading phase 2008-2012.
18
 Based on Schleich and Betz (2005) 
Table 1: provides a summary of those design features which may be most relevant for 
the innovation impact of the EU ETS: (1) the cap or emission budget, (2) the rules of 
banking from one period to the next, (3) the allocation method for existing installations, 
(4) the treatment of new entrants, including transfer rules from existing to new installa-
tions, (5) allocation rules for the closure of installations, and (6) information provided 
about future allocations.19 
 
Based on an analysis of its design features for its pilot phase a limited innovation impact 
of the EU ETS is anticipated. This can be traced back to the scheme’s lenient cap, gen-
erous links to the project-based Kyoto Mechanisms Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI)  which further reduce EUA prices, the prohibition 
of banking allowances into the second trading period and the negligible role of auction-
ing as an allocation mechanism. In addition, the free allocation to new entrants based on 
differentiated benchmarks, the termination of free allocations to closing plants as well 
as uncertainty about future rules are all said to weaken the scheme’s expected innova-
tion impact. However, incentives for low-carbon innovation generated by the EU ETS 
have improved between phase 1 and phase 2, for example through tighter emission caps 
and the gradual introduction of auctioning. Some of the remaining shortcomings in the 
                                                     
14  See René Kemp and Serena Pontoglio, ‘The Innovation Effects of Environmental Policy Instruments 
— A Typical Case of the Blind Men and the Elephant ?’ (2011) 72 Ecological Economics 28; 
Karoline S Rogge and Kristin Reichardt, ‘Towards a More Comprehensive Policy Mix 
Conceptualization for Environmental Technological Change’ (2013) S 3/2013. 
15  See Nicholas A Ashford, Christine Ayers and RF Stone, ‘Using Regulation to Change the Market 
for Innovation’ (1985) 9 Harvard Environmental Law Review 419; Manuel Frondel, J Horbach and 
K Rennings, ‘What Triggers Environmental Management and Innovation? Empirical Evidence for 
Germany’ (2008) 66 Ecological Economics 153; Manuel Frondel, Jens Horbach and Klaus 
Rennings, ‘End-of-Pipe or Cleaner Production? An Empirical Comparison of Environmental 
Innovation Decisions Across OECD Countries’ (2007) 16 Business Strategy and the Environment 
571. 
16  See Jens Hamprecht, ‘Regulatory Uncertainty : A Reason to Postpone Investments ? Not Necessarily 
Volker H . Hoffmann , Thomas Trautmann and.’ 
17  See Ivan Hascic, Nick Johnstone and Margarita Kalamova, ‘Environmental Policy Flexibility, 
Search and Innovation’ (2009) 59 Finance a úvěr - Szech Journal of Economics and Finance 426. 
18  See R Betz, K Rogge and J Schleich, ‘EU Emissions Trading: An Early Analysis of National 
Allocation Plans for 2008-1012’ (2006) 6 Climate Policy 361; Regina Betz, Wolfgang Eichhammer 
and Joachim; Schleich, ‘Designing National Allocation Plans for EU-Emissions Trading - A First 
Analysis of the Outcomes’ (2004) 15 Energy & Environment 375. 
19  See Joachim Schleich and Regina Betz, ‘Incentives for Energy Efficiency and Innovation in the 
European Emission Trading System’ (2005). 
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scheme’s design have been addressed within its third phase.20 Despite these improve-
ments several studies point out the general insufficiency of an emission trading system like 
the EU ETS for promoting the development of breakthrough technologies, but see its 
strength in achieving short-term cost minimization, e.g. by getting commercially available 
technologies off the shelf.21  
 
Table 1: EU ETS design elements relevant for the innovation effect of the EU ETS22 
No. Element Innovation effect 
1 Cap The lower the total quantity of allowances allocated 
to installations, the higher the price, the higher the 
innovation incentive 
2 Banking Banking from one period to the next accelerates in-
novation 
3 Allocation method for exist-
ing installations 
Auctioning tends to have stronger innovation effects 
than grandfathering 
4 New entrant rules, including 
transfer rules 
Highest innovation incentive if new entrants have to 
buy allowances on the market; when benchmarking 
is used the innovation incentive is greatest for undif-
ferentiated product-specific benchmarks because 
they do not limit the innovation incentive to specific 
sub-groups, such as certain fuels or technologies 
5 Closure rules Termination of allowances issuance within the peri-
od of plant closures results in too long operation 
times for old plants and postponements of new in-
vestments 
6 Information about future 
rules 
Clarity reduces investment uncertainty which is ben-
eficial for innovation 
 
In conclusion, the literature-based, ex-ante examinations of the potential impact of the EU 
ETS on innovation expect modest incentives at best, which, however, should increase in the 
second and third trading period, given some improvements in instrument design. However, 
                                                     
20  See Joachim Schleich, Karoline Rogge and Regina Betz, ‘Incentives for Energy Efficiency in the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme’ 37. For an example of the largely distortive replacement incentives 
generated by the allocation rules of the EU ETS for the power sector in 2008-12 see Karoline S 
Rogge and Christian Linden, ‘Cross-Country Comparison of the Incentives of the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme for Replacing Existing Power Plants in 2008-12’ (2010) 21 Energy & Environment 
757. 
21  See Björn A Sandén and Christian Azar, ‘Near-Term Technology Policies for Long-Term Climate 
Targets — Economy Wide versus Technology Specific Approaches’ (2005) 33 Energy Policy 1557; 
Christian Egenhofer and others, ‘The EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Taking Stock and Looking 
Ahead’ (2006); Cedric Philibert, ‘Technology Innovation, Development and Diffusion’ (2003); 
David Montgomery, ‘Creating Technologies to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Intensity: Public Options & 
Opportunities’ (2005). 
22  Summarized from p. 1497ff. in ibid. 
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the improvements in the stringency of the emissions cap have been largely compensated by 
the unforeseen emissions reductions associated with the financial and economic crisis, re-
sulting in continuously low EUA prices. Therefore, taking into consideration this additional 
crisis-driven lack of scarcity in EUA an even smaller innovation impact of the EU ETS is to 
be expected. In the following sections I review the empirical evidence on the scheme’s ac-
tual innovation impact, starting by examining the impact of the EU ETS on technological 
innovation (section III) and then taking a closer look at its impact on organizational innova-
tion (section IV).  
 
 
 
II. IMPACT ON TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
 
In this section I review the empirical evidence of the impact of the EU ETS on technologi-
cal innovation. In doing so, I exclude its impact on investment in new plants or moderniza-
tion of existing plants even though some of these adoption decisions may represent low 
carbon solutions new to the firm, which, however, most studies do not clarify. Given these 
blurry boundaries between innovation and diffusion, in this section I only include studies 
with an explicit focus on innovation. These studies use patents, R&D expenditures or intro-
duced low-carbon product or process innovations as proxies for innovation.  
 
 
a. Evidence for phase 1 (2005-07) 
 
Early studies on the impact of the EU ETS on technological innovation draw a moderately 
positive picture of the scheme’s incentives for low-carbon research and development 
(R&D). One of the earliest insight results from a survey conducted by McKinsey and 
Ecofys in June-September 2005 across EU Member States and across all sectors regulated 
by the EU ETS.23 Based on the responses of 147 firms the study finds that more than half 
of the respondents (53%) claim that the EU ETS has a strong or at least medium impact on 
company decisions to develop innovative low-carbon technologies. In contrast, less than 
one fifth of respondents (16%) stated that all R&D decisions are made independently of the 
EU ETS and thus see no innovation impact of the EU ETS at all. The study shows striking 
differences across sectors, which range from all companies saying that the EU ETS has no 
impact at all on the development of innovative technologies (aluminum industry) to over 
two thirds of firms claiming a strong innovation impact (steel industry). According to this 
study, a positive impact of the EU ETS on technological innovation should be expected, 
with the strongest impact for steel (84%), refineries (60%), other ETS sectors (59%) and 
power generation (55%), and the weakest in chemicals (41%), pulp and paper (33%) and 
aluminum (0%).  
 
This fairly positive finding of the innovation impact of the EU ETS during the pilot phase is 
confirmed by a large-scale cross-sectoral study specifically evaluating the innovation im-
pact of the EU ETS in its first trading phase conducted by Borghesi et al. (2015) for the 
                                                     
23  See McKinsey and Ecofys, ‘Review of EU Emissions Trading Scheme: Survey Highlights’ (2005). 
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manufacturing industry in Italy.24 This study links firm-specific data on eco-innovation – 
aiming at energy and CO2 reduction – of the Italian Community Innovation Survey (CIS) 
from 200825 with sector-specific data regarding the sector’s coverage by the EU ETS – 
using an ETS dummy for paper and paper products, coke and refinery, ceramics and cement 
and metallurgy.26 In addition, each of these sector’s EU ETS stringency – in terms of the 
sector’s ratio of emissions to allocated EU allowances (EUA) – is considered. On the one 
hand, the regression results – using the ETS dummy – show that in phase 1 ETS sectors 
were more likely to innovate than non-ETS sectors (n=6,483). On the other hand, for the 
ETS sectors (n=1,613) the study finds a statistically significant albeit negative link between 
ETS stringency and eco-innovation, indicating an increased likelihood to innovate in sectors 
with lower EU ETS stringency. One of the reasons the study provides for this surprising 
finding is that innovative firms may have reacted early in anticipation of the introduction of 
the ETS which would confirm the innovation impact of expected environmental regulation. 
Another reason suggested are sector specific weaknesses in adopting eco-innovations which 
seem to be particularly pronounced for cement and ceramic firms, and thus for sectors with 
high ETS stringency indicators. However, the evidence may also be due to the use of sector 
specific instead of firm specific data on EU ETS stringency. Therefore, the study provides 
mixed evidence on the innovation impact of the EU ETS. However, when only considering 
whether a sector is covered by the EU ETS or not, then the analysis provides clear support 
of a positive effect of the first phase of the EU ETS on the adoption of energy and CO2 sav-
ing eco-innovations. Yet, the underlying data does not allow for a differentiation of techno-
logical and organization innovation. 
 
The analysis conducted by Anderson et al. (2010) for all EU ETS sectors in Ireland pro-
vides further evidence of a positive albeit very moderate impact of the EU ETS on techno-
logical innovation.27 This result is derived from a mail survey conducted with Irish EU ETS 
firms during the first trading phase (n=27, representing a response rate of 40%), and was 
supplemented with follow-up interviews with seven of the participating firms. Based on 
descriptive statistics and qualitative data analysis the study concludes that the introduction 
of a CO2 price has increased firms’ appetite for low-carbon innovation, but that the EUA 
price is too low, the EU ETS is too uncertain and that energy prices tend to be more im-
                                                     
24  I.e., energy sectors are explicitly excluded from the analysis. See Simone Borghesi, Giulio Cainelli 
and Massimiliano Mazzanti, ‘Linking Emission Trading to Environmental Innovation: Evidence 
from the Italian Manufacturing Industry’ (2015) 44 Research Policy 669. 
25  The eco-innovation dummy becomes 1 if a company has introduced a product, process, organiza-
tional or marketing innovation with an environmental benefit in the period 2006-2008 – the study 
differentiates between reduced energy use per unit of output (ECOEN) and reduced CO2 ‘footprint’ 
(total CO2 production) by an enterprise (ECOCO). In total, the study finds 17.6% ECOEN innova-
tors and 14.1% ECOCO innovators (n=6,483). 
26  That is, a firm must not necessarily be participating in the EU ETS, e.g. if its production is below the 
ETS thresholds, but it is classified as EU ETS sector if it belongs to a sector that is covered by the 
EU ETS. Also, note that manufacture of chemicals and chemical products is not included as EU ETS 
sector, nor is manufacture of machinery and equipment, thereby omitting potential effects at firms 
supplying production equipment for EU ETS firms. 
27  See Barry J Anderson, Frank Convery and Corrado Di Maria, ‘Technological Change and the EU 
ETS: The Case of Ireland. Working Paper n.43’ [2010] SSRN Electronic Journal 1. 
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portant than the EU ETS.28 As a matter of fact, the large majority of firms reported that the 
EUA price had no effect on their decision relating to machinery and equipment (74%), pro-
cess change (70%) and fuel switching (78%), but that these were mainly encouraged by 
rising energy prices. The study concludes that in the pilot phase of the EU ETS mainly low-
cost and low-risk abatement opportunities were employed, such as process changes and fuel 
switching. However, the study also highlights that Irish firms tend to be technology takers 
buying new technologies from external suppliers (92%) rather than developing them inter-
nally (8%), and thus their innovation responses may not be representative for EU ETS firms 
in other EU member states. 
 
In addition to these cross-country and/or cross-sectoral studies Pontoglio (2010) provides 
early evidence regarding the innovation impact of the EU ETS in the Italian pulp and paper 
industry.29 Her unit of analysis is not EU ETS firms but EU ETS plant operators of which 
thirty eight (of 163) participated in a survey conducted in May-June 2006. The study finds a 
wait-and-see strategy of operators: they addressed the typical shortage in allowances by 
making use of borrowing (and banking) provisions of the EU ETS. That is, most pulp and 
paper producers followed a conservative and cautious approach to decision making, with so 
far only thirteen percent of them having invested in technological innovation aimed at re-
ducing CO2 emissions. However, one third of respondents (35%) indicated that they were 
developing CO2 and energy saving innovation projects to be implemented in subsequent 
years. Based on these findings and additional interviews with industry experts Pontoglio 
concludes that the EU ETS in its pilot phase did not or at best did only modestly encourage 
technological innovation.  
 
Finally, two studies of German power generators provide in depth insights in the innovation 
impact of the first phase of the EU ETS, and thereby further supplement the aforementioned 
cross-country, cross-sectoral quantitative studies. The study by Hoffmann (2007) is based 
on five company case studies for which 20 interviews with senior managers of German 
electricity providers were conducted in March-July 2006.30 It finds that in its first trading 
phase the EU ETS only had limited effects on R&D efforts, mainly by accelerating selected 
R&D activities within the fossil fuel regime. Most predominantly, the EU ETS was found to 
provide additional incentives for ongoing R&D projects aiming at an increase of the energy 
efficiency of fossil-fuel power plants. It was also shown to increase companies’ interest in 
carbon capture and storage technologies (CCS), despite their detrimental effect on energy 
efficiency and the associated high regulatory and technological uncertainties. The study of 
Cames (2010) supports and sheds further lights on these findings of the limited innovation 
impact of the EU ETS in the German electricity sector by drawing on qualitative panel 
                                                     
28  For example, the study finds that 74% of respondents have undertaken process changes leading to a 
reduction of energy use and emissions, but despite being short firms claimed to be more driven by 
energy than EUA prices. In addition, only a small share of R&D spending is related to CO2, and the 
little that is done focuses on process innovations. 
29  See Serena Pontoglio, ‘An Early Assessment of the Influence on Eco-Innovation of the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme - Evidence from the Italian Paper Industry’ in A Mazzanti, M.; Montini 
(ed), Environmental Efficiency, Innovation and Economic Performance (Routledge 2010). 
30  See Volker H Hoffmann, ‘EU ETS and Investment Decisions’ (2007) 25 European Management 
Journal 464. 
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analysis among twenty German power generators.31 In this before-after research design 
interviews took place in 2004 – and thus before the start of the EU ETS – and were then 
repeated in 2007, i.e. 2.5 years after the scheme‘s introduction. The study finds that, 
before the inception of the EU ETS, there were mainly organizational innovations, 
while hard innovations involving larger investments were postponed. But even by 2007, 
the EU ETS had not generated enough incentives to trigger substantial investments in 
R&D activities, with the exception of clean coal and particularly CCS. Cames also notes 
an increased interest in renewable energy technologies, as the EU ETS has enforced the 
perception that renewable energy will play an important role in the future electricity 
system.  
 
Overall, these studies suggest a positive but moderate impact of the EU ETS on the de-
velopment of low-carbon technologies which occurred across multiple sectors and dif-
ferent countries. Most studies also point out that the effect would have been stronger 
with a higher CO2 price and lower regulatory uncertainty about the future of the 
EU ETS.  
 
 
b. Evidence for phase 2 (2008-12) 
 
The evidence on the impact of the EU ETS on low-carbon technological innovation in its 
second trading phase (2008-12) is less positive, as revealed by two cross-sectoral, cross-
country studies and a few more focused sectoral studies. Calel and Dechezleprêtre (2013) 
provide a comprehensive analysis based on low-carbon patents (up to 2010) of 743 EU ETS 
firms and 1’019 non-EU ETS firm in 18 EU Member States.32 While the study finds an 
increase of the overall share of low-carbon patents since the introduction of the EU ETS in 
2005, their more sophisticated econometric estimations – based on the combination of 
matching methods with difference-in-differences – suggest that the EU ETS had “virtually 
no impact at all on low-carbon technological change“ (p. 18). This finding is partly alleviat-
ed by Martin et al. (2011) who find mixed results regarding the innovation impact of the EU 
ETS.33 Their regression analysis is based on phone interviews conducted in August-
October 2009 with 800 manufacturing firms across 6 EU Member States – among them 446 
ETS firms. It finds that the EU ETS in its second phase had a positive impact on the devel-
opment of cleaner products, but not on cleaner production processes – using a dummy vari-
able for measuring if a firm is part of the EU ETS or not. However, when looking at the 
perceived stringency of the EU ETS – measured by the amount of allowances companies 
receive for free in the EU ETS – the study finds the opposite result, namely that higher 
stringency of the firm-specific cap is associated with more clean process innovations but 
                                                     
31  See Martin Cames, ‘Emissions Trading and Innovation in the German Electricity Industry’ (TU 
Berlin 2010). 
32  See Raphael Calel and Antoine Dechezleprêtre, ‘Environmental Policy and Directed Technological 
Change: Evidence from the European Carbon Market’ (2012). 
33  See Ralf; Martin, Mirabelle; Muûls and Ulrich Wagner, ‘Carbon Markets, Carbon Prices and 
Innovation: Evidence from Interviews with Managers’, Paper presented at the EAERE conference 
29 June–2 July 2011 (2011). 
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irrelevant for product innovations. Hence, while the EU ETS may not have a measurable 
impact on patenting behavior of EU ETS firms, it seems to have partly influenced clean 
product and process innovations. However, in a comparable study based on 190 manufac-
turing firms in the UK – 33 of them subject to the EU ETS – interviewed in January-
March 2009, Martin et al. (2012) do not find support of a positive impact of the EU ETS on 
low carbon product or process innovation, but only on general R&D.34  
 
The lack of evidence of a positive innovation impact of the EU ETS in its second trading 
phase is partly corroborated but also slightly modified in sector-specific analyses. Most of 
these sector-specific analyses have been performed for the electricity sector. Based on com-
pany data gathered in an online survey of electricity generators and technology providers in 
six EU Member States conducted in November-December 2009, i.e. just before the Copen-
hagen climate summit, Schmidt et al. (2012) find that the EU ETS in its first two trading 
phases neither had a positive impact on R&D in renewable nor in fossil fuel electricity gen-
eration technologies (n=130).35 A preceding qualitative study by Rogge et al. (2011) based 
on in-depth interviews conducted with nineteen companies in the electricity sector from 
June 2008 until June 2009 had already alluded to this limited innovation impact of the EU 
ETS.36 However, this study also shows that the innovation impact of the EU ETS varies 
tremendously across technologies and firms, with the largest impact occurring among the 
most carbon-intensive technologies and among incumbents with large-scale coal power 
generation technologies in their portfolios. More precisely, the study finds that the largest 
impact of the EU ETS on corporate R&D occurs for CCS and improvements of the energy 
efficiency of coal technologies. This effect appeared particularly pronounced for power 
generators for whom the EU ETS apparently signaled the beginning of fundamental 
change in their business environment to which they decided to respond, among others, 
with an increased engagement in CCS R&D projects with German and international 
technology providers and chemical industry players. The reason for this not showing up 
in the findings of other studies, such as in the regression results by Schmidt et al., may 
simply be that only a handful of large companies are involved in such R&D activities on 
CCS. In addition, as Rogge et al. point out, it is not only the EU ETS which has driven 
the increase in R&D on CCS but that other factors have played a role, as well, including 
the prospects of stringent long-term climate policy, debates about the introduction of 
performance standards for thermal power plants, public research funds, and a lack of 
public acceptance for coal.  
 
                                                     
34  However, the significance of this relationship vanishes when more covariates are included, which, 
however, could be due to the small sample size, see Ralf Martin and others, ‘Anatomy of a Paradox: 
Management Practices, Organizational Structure and Energy Efficiency’ (2012) 63 Journal of 
Environmental Economics and Management 208. 
35  See Tobias S Schmidt and others, ‘The Effects of Climate Policy on the Rate and Direction of 
Innovation’ (2012) 2 Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions 23. 
36  The sample included 7 electricity generators, 10 technology providers, and 2 project developers, see 
Karoline S Rogge, Malte Schneider and Volker H Hoffmann, ‘The Innovation Impact of the EU 
Emission Trading System — Findings of Company Case Studies in the German Power Sector’ 
(2011) 70 Ecological Economics 513. 
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Comparable qualitative results for the pulp and paper sectors in Germany, Italy, Sweden 
and Norway suggest that the EU ETS in its second trading phase has not impacted tech-
nological innovation in the paper industry. Based on case study interviews and a survey 
of German pulp and paper producers (n=19) as well as technology providers (n=17) 
conducted between June 2008 and September 2009 Rogge et al. (2011) conclude that 
the EU ETS has hardly impacted corporate innovation activities.37 Instead, market fac-
tors and here particularly the price and demand for paper have been singled out as key 
for innovation activities in the German pulp and paper industry. In addition, and in con-
trast to the electricity sector, the regulatory pull effect of the EU ETS has barely trickled 
down from companies regulated by the EU ETS to those providing the equipment for 
producing paper and pulp. Gasbarro et al. (2013) arrive at a similar conclusion on the 
absence of an innovation impact of the EU ETS for the Italian pulp and paper indus-
try.38 Based on interviews with six Italian companies conducted from December 2010 
until March 2011 the study finds that pulp and paper producers have not undertaken any 
additional investment in technological innovation in response to the EU ETS. Reasons 
for this include, among others, low and volatile carbon prices, the EU ETS just being 
one of many investment factors, and long-time horizons of investments – with most 
recent ones having been planned prior to the introduction of the EU ETS. Finally, 
Gulbrandson and Stenquist (2013) show that the EU ETS has also not triggered a search 
for innovative low-carbon solutions in the pulp and paper industry in Sweden and Nor-
way.39 This insight is based on interviews with one pulp and paper producer in Sweden 
and one in Norway and three complementary interviews conducted from June 2010 un-
til October 2011. Taken together, this evidence allows for the conclusion that the impact 
of the EU ETS on technological innovation which was limited in the electricity sector is 
even weaker, or non-existent for the pulp and paper industry.  
 
Empirical evidence for the link between the EU ETS and innovation for other industry 
sectors is limited, but the few studies that do exist confirm the existence of sectoral dif-
ferences in companies’ responses to environmental regulation in general, including the 
EU ETS.40 One of the few studies of the innovation impact of the EU ETS in industry 
                                                     
37  See Karoline S. Rogge and others, ‘The Role of the Regulatory Framework for Innovation 
Activities: The EU ETS and the German Paper Industry’ (2011) 11 International Journal 
Technology, Policy and Management 250. 
38  See Federica Gasbarro, Francesco Rizzi and Marco Frey, ‘The Mutual Influence of Environmental 
Management Systems and the EU ETS: Findings for the Italian Pulp and Paper Industry’ (2013) 31 
European Management Journal 16. 
39  See Lars H Gulbrandsen and Christian Stenqvist, ‘The Limited Effect of EU Emissions Trading on 
Corporate Climate Strategies: Comparison of a Swedish and a Norwegian Pulp and Paper Company’ 
(2013) 56 Energy Policy 516. 
40  See Simone Borghesi and others, ‘Carbon Abatement, Sector Heterogeneity and Policy Responses: 
Evidence on Induced Eco Innovations in the EU’ (2015) 54 Environmental Science & Policy 377. 
Based on 29 interviews conducted with industry associations in eight EU Member States in June – 
July 2013 this study provides some evidence on the limited but varying role of the EU ETS as one of 
several other policy instruments on the following sectors: ceramics and cement, paper, energy, coke 
and refinery. 
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(other than in the paper industry) was conducted for the German cement industry by 
Schleich et al. (2010), using evidence from interviews conducted with company repre-
sentatives of four cement manufacturers and four technology providers between October 
2008 and July 2009.41 This study finds that the EU ETS has led to a somewhat stronger 
focus of R&D activities on energy, given the add-on effect of costs for allowances to 
energy costs. The EU ETS is also one of several factors supporting some engagement of 
cement producers in R&D activities on CCS. It also seems to reflect positively on ongo-
ing research on green cement, but in general product innovations tend to be incremental 
and largely driven by customer demands which are not yet paying much attention to 
CO2. The study also notes that the innovation impact of the EU ETS on technology pro-
viders is negligible since demand for new cement plants is largely located outside of 
Europe where climate policies play a much smaller role.  
 
Overall, it can therefore be concluded that despite the improvements in the EU ETS design 
it did not generate any significant impact on technological innovation in its second trading 
phase; the only exception to this is an increased interest in R&D on carbon capture and 
storage technologies, particularly in the electricity sector. 
 
 
c. Outlook for phase 3 (2013-20) 
 
While there is yet no empirical study which has investigated the actual innovation impact of 
the EU ETS in its third trading phase, several of the studies conducted during the second 
trading phase also provide indications on the expected innovation impact of the EU ETS up 
to 2020. All of these studies suggest that the impact of the EU ETS on technological inno-
vation is going to increase in its third phase.  
 
In their cross-sector, cross-country study Martin et al. (2011) find no significant link be-
tween the EU ETS and technological innovation – neither for clean product nor clean pro-
cess innovation – when only using a dummy variable for the EU ETS which captures 
whether a company expects to be subject to the EU ETS in its third trading phase or not.42 
Similarly, firms’ expectations of the CO2 price by 202043 are not significantly related with 
higher levels of low-carbon innovation, i.e. higher price expectations do not seem to be 
associated with more clean product nor clean process innovation. In contrast, the study finds 
that firms expecting their future allowance allocation to be more stringent pursue more 
clean product innovation, and in some models also more clean process innovation. This 
suggests that not the price of CO2 but rather the actual costs – rather than opportunity costs 
– associated with CO2 emissions stimulate low-carbon innovation. That is, free allocation 
seems to disincentivize low-carbon innovation, while paying for – at least a part of – CO2 
emissions leads to more low-carbon innovation, with particularly strong evidence for clean 
product innovation. 
                                                     
41  See Joachim Schleich and others, ‘Wirkungen Neuer Klimapolitischer Instrumente Auf 
Innovationstätigkeiten Und Marktchancen Baden-Württembergischer Unternehmen’ (2010). 
42  See Martin, Muûls and Wagner. 
43  The median price expected for 2020 by companies was €30€, the mean €40. 
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For their cross-country study of the electricity sector Schmidt et al. (2012) find that firms’ 
perceptions of the EU ETS negatively affect their R&D investments for non-emitting power 
generation technologies, in particular for renewable energies.44 That is, those companies 
which perceive the EU ETS in its third trading phase as more negative increase their R&D 
in non-emitting technologies, i.e. in renewable energies. In contrast, no significant link is 
found for overall R&D or R&D in emitting technologies, as was already the case for the 
first two phases of the EU ETS. Since all power generators are required to purchase all of 
their allowances this implies that particularly power generators with higher emitting tech-
nologies in their portfolio are incentivized to spend more on R&D in clean technologies, 
suggesting a redirection of innovation activities in this sector towards low-carbon solutions. 
 
Finally, for industry sectors, two studies on the German pulp and paper sector and the ce-
ment sector indicate that despite its so far negligible impact on technological innovation 
firms expect the relevance of the EU ETS for R&D to increase by 2020.45 
 
However, these expectations were largely resting on the assumption of rising stringency and 
allowance prices of the EU ETS. Yet, EUA prices have remained low, and have remained 
low after the landmark agreement at COP 21 in Paris. This suggests that companies do not 
yet believe that the global climate agreement reached in Paris will be translated into 
strengthening the stringency and thus the allowance prices of the EU ETS. Should these 
expectations turn out to be true, then future studies on the impact of the EU ETS on techno-
logical innovation in its third trading phase are unlikely to lead to results which differ sig-
nificantly from the very limited effect found for its second trading phase.  
 
 
 
III. IMPACT ON ORGANISATIONAL INNOVATION 
 
Studying the impact of the EU ETS on organizational innovation has been somewhat ne-
glected in the literature when compared to technological innovation, both in terms of scope 
of analysis and methodological rigor. First, there is no study which dedicatedly addresses 
the impact of the EU ETS on organizational innovation. Rather, studies either treat it as a 
side aspect alongside technological innovation,46 address only selected aspects of organiza-
tional innovation – often in a non-systematic manner – or address organizational change (or 
elements thereof) rather than organizational innovation.47 Second, many studies stop short 
                                                     
44  See Schmidt and others. 
45  See Rogge and others, ‘The Role of the Regulatory Framework for Innovation Activities: The EU 
ETS and the German Paper Industry’; Schleich and others. 
46  As a matter of fact, the evidence presented here on the impact of the EU ETS on organizational 
innovation largely draws on some of the studies already reviewed within the section on technologi-
cal innovation, but is complemented with a few specialized studies focusing on organizational as-
pects only. 
47  According to the Oslo manual the difference between organizational change and organizational 
innovation is that the latter “has not been used before in the firm and is the result of strategic deci-
sions taken by management”, see p. 51 in OECD and Eurostat. 
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at identifying organizational innovation but do not investigate the role the EU ETS played 
for the observed changes. As a consequence, insights on the causal link between the EU 
ETS and observed organizational innovation remain limited. Finally, evidence is largely 
based on qualitative case studies based on interviews and often limited to one particular 
sector and country. The few quantitative studies including some selected aspects of organi-
zational innovation only use descriptive statistics in analyzing their data, making their con-
tribution to the evidence base rather small, at least in comparison to some of the rigorous 
case study analyses. Yet, despite these limitations the combination of insights of the identi-
fied studies reveals a relatively clear picture regarding a positive impact of the EU ETS on 
organizational innovation which in most instances has already occurred in the first trading 
phase. 
 
In reviewing the evidence on the impact of the EU ETS on organizational innovation, I will 
structure this section according to the relevant aspects provided by the Oslo Manual’s defi-
nition of organizational innovation as “the implementation of a new organizational method 
in the firm’s business practices, workplace organisation or external relations”.48 Organiza-
tional innovations in business practices comprise “new methods for organising routines and 
procedures for the conduct of work”. This component of organizational innovation is by far 
the most widely studied in the context of the EU ETS. It is, of course, often connected to 
innovations in workplace organization which capture “new methods for distributing respon-
sibilities and decision making among employees for the division of work within and be-
tween firm activities (and organisational units), as well as new concepts for the structuring 
of activities, such as the integration of different business activities”. Here, many studies 
allude to the role of top management in dealing with the EU ETS, but also address other 
structural changes. Finally, organizational innovation also includes innovations in external 
relations, i.e. “new ways of organizing relations with other firms or public institutions”. 
While several studies find such new collaborations, integration with suppliers, outsourcing 
or subcontracting in the context of the EU ETS, they typically do not address this explicitly 
as an organizational innovation. Also, the empirical evidence suggests that EU ETS trig-
gered innovations in business practices go along with changes in workplace organization 
and/or external relations. However, for analytical purposes these different aspects of organi-
zational innovations will be discussed in turn rather than in an integrated manner. 
 
 
a. Innovations in business practices 
 
Organizational innovation in business practices covers new routines and procedures associ-
ated with the introduction of the EU ETS. Some studies refer to this as procedural change49 
and others suggest differentiating between those practices concerning physical CO2 man-
agement and those addressing financial CO2 management.50 Innovations in physical CO2 
                                                     
48  See p. 51f. in ibid. Note that the reviewed studies typically do not apply this standard definition of 
organizational innovation which complicates a systematic analysis of the findings. 
49  See Rogge, Schneider and Hoffmann; Rogge and others, ‘The Role of the Regulatory Framework for 
Innovation Activities: The EU ETS and the German Paper Industry’; Schleich and others. 
50  See Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey. 
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management cover, among others, the introduction of carbon emission monitoring, verifi-
cation and reporting as well as the set up of other compliance procedures for the novel 
market-based instrument EU ETS. Cross-sectoral anectdotal evidence collected during 
the first phase of the EU ETS by Kenber et al. (2009) from nine companies located in 
different countries indicates that firms have significantly expanded and improved their 
CO2 monitoring and cost-assessment capabilities, including the introduction of precise 
monitoring of CO2 emissions and the implementation of a carbon accounts for invest-
ment decisions.51 Similarly, for Ireland an early cross-sectoral survey conducted by 
Anderson et al. (2010) finds that the EU ETS has led to the adoption of verifiable emis-
sions accounting and a greater awareness of CO2 emissions reduction possibilities in 
companies subject to the EU ETS.52 In line with these findings Sandoff and Schaad 
(2009) report how Swedish companies subject to the EU ETS had implemented the 
novel instrument in their organization.53 For 2006, they find that of the multiple organi-
zational innovations involved the measurement and verification of emissions is the most 
time consuming of the compliance-related activities.54 On a more strategic level Ander-
son et al. (2010) report that for almost half of the Irish EU ETS firms (46%) the scheme 
has influenced how investments in capital and infrastructure are analyzed.55 
 
The most detailed account on the dynamics and scope of organizational innovation in 
response to the EU ETS is provided by Cames (2010) for the German electricity sec-
tor.56 He finds that a few months prior to the introduction of the EU ETS the large ma-
jority of the interviewed twenty two power generators had already introduced CO2 
emission scenarios and about half of them had established continuous monitoring of 
CO2 emissions as well as implemented a tool for comparing EU allowances and CO2 
emissions. In contrast, only few power generators had started to work with avoidance 
cost curves and only a minority had introduced risk management procedures. However, 
towards the end of the pilot phase of the EU ETS more companies had implemented 
                                                     
51  This is based on interviews with nine large companies based in different countries and belonging to 
different sectors directly or indirectly covered by the EU ETS conducted during the pilot phase of 
the EU ETS, see Mark Kenber, Oliver Haugen and Madeleine Cobb, ‘The Effects of EU Climate 
Legislation on Business Competitiveness : A Survey and Analysis’, vol 09 (2009). 
52  See Anderson, Convery and Di Maria. 
53  These insights are based on a web-based company survey conducted among the 221 EU ETS firms 
in Sweden in April – July 2006 (response rate of 52%), see Anders Sandoff and Gabriela Schaad, 
‘Does EU ETS Lead to Emission Reductions through Trade? The Case of the Swedish Emissions 
Trading Sector Participants’ (2009) 37 Energy Policy 3967. 
54  Sandhoff and Schaad (2009) found a gap between companies’ perception on the administrative ef-
forts required due to the introduction of the EU ETS by companies and themselves. They themselves 
judged the labor time employed to be fairly moderate and did not see the EU ETS as raising ques-
tions regarding the administrative efficiency of the EU ETS. A similar complaint about the time and 
effort needed to comply with the EU ETS was reported for both the German paper and cement in-
dustry, see Schleich and others. 
55  See Anderson, Convery and Di Maria. 
56  Note that Cames uses the term “soft” institutional innovations, see Cames. 
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organizational innovations. For example, by 2007 all power generators had introduced a 
tool comparing EUA with emissions, almost all were working with emission scenarios 
and the majority of companies had adapted their risk hedging strategies. A comparable 
study conducted in 2008/09 by Rogge et al. (2011) confirms the strong impact the EU 
ETS had on the business procedures of German power generators and finds that overall 
the EU ETS has led to a change in companies’ CO2 cultures. 57 The findings also sug-
gest that organizational innovations were first introduced regarding operational aspects 
and continuously moved towards more strategic aspects, such as the integration of CO2 
into all investment appraisals. 
 
The impact of the EU ETS on organizational innovation has also been investigated for 
the pulp and paper industry – by means of company interviews conducted in four differ-
ent countries during the second trading phase of the EU ETS.58 For Italy, Gasbarro et 
al. (2013) showed how the physical management of CO2 has been integrated for all but 
one of the studied six Italian paper producers into existing environmental management 
systems. However, none of the analyzed paper producers introduced specific procedures 
for a systemic management of emission reduction opportunities, but instead has treated 
this within existing procedures for managing investments. Similarly, Gulbrandsen and 
Stenqvist (2013) find an increase of resources being put into site-level administration 
and reporting of greenhouse gas emissions data since the introduction of the EU ETS 
for the studied Norwegian and Swedish paper producers.59 The descriptive survey re-
sults by Rogge et al. (2011) for the German paper industry allow some further insights 
on the implementation of organizational innovation between 2005 and 2009.60 By 2009, 
almost seventy percent of paper producers had started to integrate CO2 and climate poli-
cy as a factor when constructing future scenarios. Surprisingly, however, the new cost 
factor CO2 had only been taken into account as new factor in operative business areas 
by 42% of paper producers. This share decreases further (to 37%) when considering the 
integration of CO2 as standard factor in investment analysis and product development 
processes, and goes down to 21% of companies for the integration of CO2 as standard 
factor when planning R&D.61 The latter is supported by Gasbarro et al. (2013) who find 
that only one of the surveyed six Italian paper producers systematically engaged in ETS-
oriented investment planning for their R&D department. The limited strategic importance of 
the EU ETS is also underlined by the EU ETS seen as one among many factors influencing 
firm strategies, and certainly not one having more importance than others. In addition, the 
influence of allowance prices on investment choices still seemed to be unclear to Italian 
                                                     
57  See Rogge, Schneider and Hoffmann. 
58  See Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey for Italy; Gulbrandsen and Stenqvist for Sweden and Norway; Rogge 
and others, ‘The Role of the Regulatory Framework for Innovation Activities: The EU ETS and the 
German Paper Industry’ for Germany. 
59  See Gulbrandsen and Stenqvist. 
60  See Rogge and others, ‘The Role of the Regulatory Framework for Innovation Activities: The EU 
ETS and the German Paper Industry.’ 
61  In contrast, the two paper producers from Sweden and Norway interviewed by Gulbrandsen and 
Stenqvist (2013) had integrated CO2 prices in investment appraisals, see Gulbrandsen and Stenqvist. 
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paper producers. This situation somewhat improves for German cement producers subject 
to the EU ETS for whom Schleich et al. (2010) find that the costs for emitting CO2 are now 
seen as important factor in investment appraisals. 62 
 
While the large majority of EU ETS firms seem to have introduced new business practices 
regarding physical CO2 management, the picture is less favorable for financial CO2 man-
agement. Innovations in financial CO2 management cover, among others, the implementa-
tion of a carbon trading strategy, of establishing routines for EUA trading and introducing 
practices for CO2 market monitoring.63 As suggested by cross-sectoral, cross-country sur-
vey data from 2009 by Martin et al. (2011) more than half of the surveyed 446 EU ETS 
participants did not engage in trading EUAs.64 Furthermore, thirty percent of EU ETS firms 
did not consider allowances as a financial asset and rather focused on compliance with the 
EU ETS, although this share differs significantly across sector (but not countries). This in-
sight on the reluctance towards an active trading strategy confirms findings of an earlier 
study by Sandoff and Schaad (2009) who surveyed the Swedish EU ETS participants in 
2006 and found that almost eighty percent of companies only traded once a year. The 
study suggests that trading was mainly conducted to minimize risks and for compliance 
purposes, rather than as a market opportunity.65 This finding was further supported by 
almost half of respondents (46%) claiming to reduce a potential EUA shortage within the 
second trading phase of the EU ETS through internal measures, such as improving and de-
veloping new production processes (18% and 56%, respectively) and developing new prod-
ucts (18%). They also note that back then JI/CDM was of marginal importance. Overall, it 
can thus be argued that financial CO2 management has become more widespread over the 
first two phases of the EU ETS, but a significant share of companies has remained reluctant. 
 
This hesitance towards trading is confirmed by Gasbarro et al. (2013) for the Italian pulp 
and paper industry.66 In general, their findings suggest a higher orientation of EU ETS 
firms with compliance rather than trading, and confirm a very limited interest in JI/CDM. 
Not surprisingly, then, the study points to companies pursuing internal emission reductions 
as main strategy. In contrast, for the electricity sector Cames (2010) shows that German 
power generators had already integrated CO2 trading into their existing trading floors from 
the very beginning of the EU ETS and started to actively engage with JI/CDM toward the 
end of the pilot phase.67 The findings for the German cement industry by Schleich et al. 
(2010) suggest that cement producers could be positioned in the middle of this spectrum of 
trading strategies, with particularly the larger ones having implemented CDM projects – 
typically with subsidiaries located in developing countries.68 In addition, almost all compa-
                                                     
62  See Schleich and others. 
63  See Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey. 
64  See Martin, Muûls and Wagner. 
65  See Sandoff and Schaad. 
66  See Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey. 
67  See Cames. 
68  See Schleich and others. 
19 
nies with CDM projects planned to use the project-based CDM credits for EU ETS compli-
ance purposes up to the limit of 22% valid in the second trading phase. However, actual 
trading varies largely across cement producers, with some companies banking any access 
EUAs for the third trading phase, others having created a new business unit on CO2 trading 
and those with internationally active companies having delegated any trading activities to 
their headquarters which tend to cooperate with banks. These sectoral differences point to a 
discrepancy regarding financial CO2 management between sectors in general, and the elec-
tricity and industry sectors in more particular, thereby corrobating the need for cross-
sectoral studies.69  
 
 
b. Innovations in workplace organization 
 
Many of the aforementioned innovations in business practices were associated with innova-
tions in workplace organizations. However, there is limited systematic evidence regarding 
the impact of the EU ETS on this aspect of organizational innovations. Still, the existing 
evidence allows for one general and two sector-specific observations regarding novelties in 
the distribution of responsibilities and decision making among employees as well as new 
concepts for the structuring of activities in response to the introduction of the EU ETS. The 
first cross-sectoral finding concerns the engagement of top management with climate poli-
cy, in general, and with the new cost factor CO2, in particular. For example, already Kenber 
et al. (2009) note that the EU ETS has led to a shift in management awareness towards cli-
mate change which as a new topic has arrived in the boardroom.70 Similarly, in their 
cross-sectoral study Sandoff and Schaad (2009) find that the EU ETS has quickly become a 
top management issue in Swedish companies.71 In particular, the study notes that trading 
decisions are taken by top management in almost two thirds of EU ETS firms (64%) and 
even actual trading was conducted by management in more than forty percent of companies 
(41%). Yet, only a third of the companies (37%) have introduced a CO2 reduction target, 
suggesting limited managerial attention to climate change, despite it being a top man-
agement issue.  
 
The second group of observations concern innovations in workplace organization in the 
electricity sector. In his study of the German electricity sector Cames (2010) shows that 
already prior to the start of the pilot phase of the EU ETS most of the interviewed twenty 
two power generators had already established a task force coordinating the implementation 
of the novel policy instrument into corporate practices.72 Interestingly, three years later 
these task forces were meeting less often as the new task arising from the introduction of 
the EU ETS had been integrated into daily business routines. According to Rogge et al. 
(2011) this decentral integration of the EU ETS even goes as far as some power generators 
stating not to have a specific person responsible for climate policy, as everyone plays a 
                                                     
69  See Borghesi and others. 
70  See Kenber, Haugen and Cobb. 
71  See Sandoff and Schaad. 
72  See Cames. 
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part.73 In addition, Cames’ second round of interviews showed that by 2007 the large utili-
ties had set up new departments for sourcing project-based CO2 certificates from the Clean 
Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation projects (CDM/JI). This finding on the 
establishment of new organizational units for CDM/JI sourcing is also confirmed by Rogge 
et al. (2011) who find that this organizational innovation is directly and predominantly driv-
en by the EU ETS.74 In contrast, the EU ETS only indirectly contributes to the establish-
ment of new business units for renewables in German utilities seen towards the end of the 
pilot phase of the EU ETS. Rather, this innovation in workplace organization leading to the 
build-up of new competencies is driven by vision changes of companies regarding internal 
2020 renewables and greenhouse gas emission targets, which in turn have been shown to 
result from the impact the implementation the EU ETS and the existence of policy support 
for renewables in the form of feed-in tariffs had for companies’ perceptions on the much 
increased credibility of the EU’s 2020 targets.75 Despite this only indirect link of the EU 
ETS with several workplace organizations it can be clearly stated that in the electricity sec-
tor the EU ETS has led to the attention of top management to climate change issues. 
 
The third group of observations concerns changes in the workplace design within the paper 
industry. For the Italian paper industry Gasbarro et al. (2013) report the introduction of new 
functions, the hiring of partly dedicated ETS staff, and the coordination of EU ETS activ-
ites. 76 More precisely, two of the six paper producers employed new ETS-dedicated 
staff, although in different functions. Interestingly, it was these firms who also stood out in 
terms of a more active engagement with trading, particularly in one company which intro-
duced a specific function for EUA trading. Similarly to findings from earlier cross-sectoral 
studies the authors further find that in the majority of companies the executive management 
was actively involved in EUA trading decisions, although the extent of involvement varies 
greatly among companies. These insights are confirmed and complemented by a study by 
Rogge et al. (2011) for the German pulp and paper industry which finds that the large 
majority of companies (84%) had appointed a responsible party or coordinator for the 
topics of CO2 and climate policy and had become more involved with these topics at 
management level.77 However, only less than a third of companies (31%) had set up 
new strategic departments in the field of climate protection. That is, the attention of top 
management to the EU ETS has led to ample vision changes, which however, do not yet 
fully translate into operational changes. A reason for this may be the difference between 
real costs vs opportunity costs, the low stringency of the EU ETS, but also operational 
slack and transaction costs.  
 
                                                     
73  See Rogge, Schneider and Hoffmann. 
74  See ibid. 
75  These long-term targets of the EU encompass a 20% reduction of CO2 emissions, an increase in the 
share of renewable energies to 20%, and a 20% improvement of energy efficiency to be reached by 
2020. 
76  See Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey. 
77  See Rogge and others, ‘The Role of the Regulatory Framework for Innovation Activities: The EU 
ETS and the German Paper Industry.’ 
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c. Innovation in external relations 
 
Organizational innovation is also given if a company implements new ways of organiz-
ing relations with other firms or public institutions in response to the EU ETS. Cross-
sectoral evidence for this is largely limited to the study by Sandoff and Schaad (2009) 
conducted for Swedish EU ETs firms.78 It finds that over half of paper producers uses 
brokers for CO2 tradings (60%) while only a third (36%) of the large companies us a 
CO2 exchange. Of course, all EU ETS firms were required to establish a link with the na-
tional administrative body responsible for the implementation of the EU ETS, but this is not 
explicitly studied. 
 
For the electricity sector Cames (2010) finds that by 2007 some large German power 
generators had started cooperating with smaller utilities by offering them market ac-
cess.79 In addition, when taking into consideration the impact of the EU ETS on the 
sectoral innovation system for power generation technologies Rogge and Hoffman 
(2010) identify new linkages of power generators with technology providers active in 
the chemical industry.80 These new external relations are a direct result of the EU ETS 
which led power generators to jointly conduct R&D on CCS, thereby effectively broad-
ening the boundaries of the innovation system. 
 
Finally, for the paper industry Gasbarro et al. (2013) find that rather than extending its 
environmental management system regarding EU ETS related activities one Italian pa-
per producer worked with a consulting service for regulatory updating, for annual emis-
sion communication, for relationships with the Authority, and for the calibration of in-
struments. Three other companies outsourced the calibration of instruments, and one 
decided to conduct its carbon market monitoring and allowance trading through a 100% 
controlled energy service subsidiary. 81 In a similar spirit of changes in external rela-
tions Rogge et al. (2011) find that in the German pulp and paper industry one fifth of 
companies (21%) had intensified climate relevant R&D partnerships after the introduc-
tion of the EU ETS.82 
 
 
d. Outlook 
 
In conclusion, the EU ETS seems to have triggered – or at least contributed to – various 
organizational innovations, with the evidence base being largest for innovations in busi-
                                                     
78  See Sandoff and Schaad. 
79  See Cames. 
80  See Karoline S Rogge and Volker H Hoffmann, ‘The Impact of the EU ETS on the Sectoral 
Innovation System for Power Generation Technologies’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 7639. 
81  See Gasbarro, Rizzi and Frey. 
82  See Rogge and others, ‘The Role of the Regulatory Framework for Innovation Activities: The EU 
ETS and the German Paper Industry.’ 
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ness practices. While keeping in mind the limits of the largely qualitative evidence base 
two key patterns for this impact of the EU ETS on organizational innovation emerge. 
First, the companies in the electricity sector seem to have been faster and more thorough 
in implementing the full range of organizational innovations. Key reasons for this may 
include the EU ETS affecting core production processes and the fertile ground prepared 
through the process of liberalization of the electricity sector.83 Second, the implementa-
tion of organizational innovations was found to be much more pronounced for EU ETS 
firms than for their counterparts supplying them with production equipment. Again, this 
varies across sectors, with the EU ETS having led to some organizational innovations in 
other parts of the value chain in the electricity sector – particularly for large diversified 
power generation suppliers. In contrast, such a trickle through effect has remained large-
ly irrelevant for suppliers of production equipment in the cement industry.84 Similarly, 
in the pulp and paper industry organizational innovations seem to be much less pro-
nounced among technology providers when compared to paper producers.85  
 
Overall, these findings on organizational innovations driven by the EU ETS are in line 
with general insights by Borghesi et al. (2015) on the impact of environmental policy on 
innovation which has shown that organizational innovations have been important in 
most sectors.86 They can be seen as operating as a leading force in technological inno-
vation, and thus as an important precondition for wider and deeper technological chang-
es should the design of the EU ETS and the policy mix into which it is embedded be 
improved. 
 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have reviewed the evidence on the innovation impact of the EU ETS 
and have found a very limited effect on technological innovation but clear signs of the 
scheme having stimulated organizational innovation.  
 
Regarding the very moderate impact on technological innovation I found initially high 
expectations regarding its innovation impact which, however, have dissipated after the 
scheme’s lack of stringency became apparent and prices have collapsed accordingly. 
The innovation impact varied across sectors and technologies, with the strongest effects 
occurring for the electricity sector and carbon capture and storage technologies. Howev-
er, with hindsight the spike of innovation in CCS needs to be seen as a temporary phe-
nomenon, which has been reduced significantly in recent years, among others due to 
                                                     
83  See Rogge and Hoffmann; Borghesi and others. 
84  See Rogge, Schneider and Hoffmann; Schleich and others. 
85  See Rogge and others, ‘The Role of the Regulatory Framework for Innovation Activities: The EU 
ETS and the German Paper Industry’, p. 266. 
86  See Borghesi and others. 
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low carbon prices in Europe and other factors, such as a lack of public acceptance for 
storing CO2 in Germany, and changed political priorities leading to the cancellation of a 
demonstration program in the UK. So far, the impact of the EU ETS on technological 
innovation is likely to remain low, despite attempts of strengthening the scheme’s de-
sign in its third trading phase (2012-2020).  
 
In contrast, there is clear evidence that the EU ETS has been a key driver in various 
organizational innovations, such as incorporating CO2 into business practices, making 
climate change a top management issue or building external relations to address the 
challenge of climate change, may that be with consultants, CO2 exchanges or new R&D 
partners. While many of these organizational innovations may still be in place – the 
exception perhaps being the shut-down of new business units primarily established in 
large companies for sourcing JI/CDM credits – these organizational innovations have so 
far had only limited effects on shifting corporate strategies towards low-carbon solu-
tions. Reasons for this include low carbon prices, the relatively high share of free alloca-
tions in industry sectors, and more pressing business concerns.  
 
The findings of this review point to three main patterns of the innovation impact of the 
EU ETS. First, the impact of the EU ETS on innovation seems to be more pronounced 
for the electricity sector than for industry sectors. This could both be observed for tech-
nological innovation and for organizational innovation. While there may be good rea-
sons for these sectoral differences, such as the importance of CO2 as cost factor in the 
production process or a higher share of auctioning in the electricity sector, it points to 
the need of focusing future efforts in stimulating low-carbon innovation towards indus-
try sectors. Of course, there remains quite some diversity within industry sectors them-
selves, as the examples of the pulp and paper industry compared to the cement industry 
have shown. Second, the innovation impact of the EU ETS was found to be much 
stronger for those firms regulated by the EU ETS than suppliers of these firms’ produc-
tion equipment. This suggest that the trickle through effect of the EU ETS to other parts 
of the value chain remains limited, particularly in industry sectors but also for suppliers 
of power generation technologies based on fossil-fuels which have largely remained 
locked-in. Given the relevant sectoral patterns of innovation found in the EU ETS sec-
tors this limited trickle through effect is likely to be a major limitation for triggering 
innovation in the related innovation systems. This calls for a wider innovation system 
perspective in future research and policy.87 Finally, for many of the observed techno-
logical innovations – typically incremental – the EU ETS was shown to be a contrib-
uting factor among others – including the broader policy mix but also the wider busi-
ness environment. In some instances it even has only played an indirect role for certain 
innovations. This complexity of the causal link between the EU ETS and innovation has 
both methodological and policy implications. 
 
                                                     
87  See Keith Pavitt, ‘Sectoral Patterns of Technical Change : Towards a Taxonomy and a Theory’ 
(1984) 13 Research Policy 343; Rogge and Hoffmann. 
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However, before moving on to these implications it needs to be noted that the evidence 
reviewed here did not include the impact of the EU ETS on diffusion. Clearly, several 
studies have investigated the impact of the EU ETS on investment decisions, such as for 
modernizations, fuel switching and new plants. The evidence suggests that the EU ETS 
has mainly contributed to incremental process innovations (including fuel switching), 
typically strengthening the effect of energy prices. For example, in Ireland over two 
thirds of EU ETS companies (74%) implemented process or behavioral changes, half of 
them (48%) employed new machinery or equipment and a good third (41%) switched 
fuels, thereby contributing to reductions in CO2 emissions.88 Another example concerns 
the electricity sector where the impact of the EU ETS on investment seems to have been 
most pronounced for retrofitting of existing plants. Regarding the investment in new 
plants the EU ETS with its free allocation for new entrants was shown to have initially 
led to more investments in polluting plants, while not influencing adoption decisions on 
non-polluting plants.89 In this context it was shown that incentives considerably depend 
on the specific design of the EU ETS, such as the overall cap, share of auctioning, allo-
cation rules for incumbents and new entrants, or closure provisions and transfer rules.90 
 
This limitation notwithstanding, this review finds a so far very limited impact of the EU 
ETS on technological innovation, but a fairly strong impact on organizational innova-
tion. Two main policy implications regarding an innovation-proof design of the EU ETS 
– and other emission trading schemes – arise from these findings: (1) increase of the 
carbon price and (2) increase of the share of auctioning. First, this review finds that a 
higher carbon price provides higher incentives for innovation. For this to happen the 
scarcity of EUA needs to be increased. Two possible key mechanisms to achieve this 
are the further reduction of the current and future cap of the EU ETS and the permanent 
retirement of excess allowances from earlier trading phases. In addition, the introduc-
tion of a minimum price should be reconsidered so that the currently very weak carbon 
price would be strengthened. Second, since free allocation was shown to be detrimental 
for innovation the share of auctioning should eventually be increased. This implies re-
considering industry exemptions based on competitiveness. A promising way forward in 
this regard could be the development of a gradual phase-out strategy for free allocation - 
coordinated with other emission trading systems, such as the soon to be implemented 
Chinese ETS, in order to address carbon leakage concerns while at the same time 
strengthening innovation incentives. Resulting auctioning revenues could be earmarked 
to further stimulate radical innovations in low-carbon solutions in industry sectors. 
Clearly, these policy implications for the redesign of the EU ETS raise difficult ques-
tions regarding both political and legal feasibility, and thus tackling them remains a ma-
jor challenge – but arguably a smaller one than introducing an EU wide carbon tax. 
Without addressing the identified shortcomings the EU ETS cannot play its foreseen 
                                                     
88  See Anderson, Convery and Di Maria. 
89  See Hoffmann; Cames; Rogge, Schneider and Hoffmann; Schmidt and others. 
90  For a detailed empirical examination of the innovation incentives arising from different design fea-
tures of the EU ETS for the German electricity sector, see Cames. 
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role in guiding the decarbonization of the European economy for which innovations in 
low-carbon solutions are a fundamental requirement.  
 
Despite the limited impact of the EU ETS on technological innovation different indica-
tors for low-carbon innovation, such as patents or innovation expenditures, indicate a 
positive innovation trend. This increasing pattern of low-carbon innovation is in con-
trast to Taylor’s (2012) observation of declining inventive activity after the introduction 
of permit trading schemes for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide control in the US.91 But 
if it is not the EU ETS which is driving this positive development, the question remains 
what else is behind it. One important part of the answer to this question is provided by 
those studies which did not only consider the EU ETS as political driver of low-carbon 
innovation but also included elements of the wider policy mix92 in their analysis.93 For 
example, the empirical evidence gathered for the electricity sector suggests that long-
term emission reduction targets, such as the EU’s 2020 targets, have been an important 
determinant of corporate innovation activities in non-polluting technologies, i.e. in re-
newable energies. In addition, the existence of technology-specific instruments promot-
ing the diffusion of low-carbon solutions, such as feed-in tariffs for renewable energies, 
have been found as another important element of the policy mix and as such comple-
ment the EU ETS.94 The relative importance of long-term targets and concrete policy 
instruments differs among innovation dimensions, with long-term targets being particu-
larly important for R&D activities of technology providers.95  
 
This review also allows for deriving a number of methodological challenges in evaluat-
ing the innovation impact of the EU ETS which should be tackled by future research. 
First, evaluating the innovation impact of the EU ETS calls for dedicated data collec-
tion, for example in the form of specialized company surveys or rigorous case studies. 
Alternatively, the utilization of existing data, such as patent data or data originating 
from the Community Innovation Survey, requires the creation of meaningful proxies 
capturing the EU ETS and its design features. Second, given the different strengths but 
also limitations of the employed methodological approaches it seems most promising to 
combine different methods into a multi-method research design combining qualitative 
and quantitative methods. Third, studies attempting to establish the innovation impact of 
the EU ETS should pay closer attention to the different sectoral patterns of innovation 
and thus extend the boundaries of their investigation accordingly. Typically, this will 
                                                     
91  See Margaret R Taylor, ‘Innovation under Cap-and-Trade Programs’ (2012) 109 PNAS 4804. 
92  See Karoline S Rogge and Kristin Reichardt, ‘Going Beyond Instrument Interactions : Towards a 
More Comprehensive Policy Mix Conceptualization for Environmental Technological Change’, vol 
12 (2015) SWPS 2015-12. 
93  See Borghesi, Cainelli and Mazzanti; Borghesi and others; Hoffmann; Schmidt and others; Rogge, 
Schneider and Hoffmann; Rogge and others, ‘The Role of the Regulatory Framework for Innovation 
Activities: The EU ETS and the German Paper Industry.’ 
94  In particular, see the findings of the cross-country study conducted by Schmidt and others. 
95  See Karoline S Rogge, Tobias S Schmidt and Malte Schneider, ‘Relative Importance of Different 
Climate Policy Elements for Corporate Climate Innovation Activities’, vol 49 (2011). 
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imply assuming an innovation system perspective in which not only EU ETS firms will 
be found to perform innovative activities but also other key actors in the system. Final-
ly, as the EU ETS is embedded in a broader policy mix studies should pay greater atten-
tion to the role played by long-term targets and other policy instruments as well as their 
interaction. However, such a thorough analysis of the innovation impact of the EU ETS 
in its third phase – ideally covering multiple sectors and countries – would be best post-
poned until the major shortcomings of the scheme have been addressed. In the mean-
time, these methodological recommendations may be also valuable for setting up evalu-
ation programs of the innovation impact of the many national and regional CO2 trading 
schemes and carbon taxes implemented around the world.96 
 
Finally, I want to emphasize that while the impact of the EU ETS on technological in-
novation has remained limited, its positive impact on organizational innovation should 
not be underestimated. The reason for this is that organizational innovations – as by 
now widely acknowledged in the innovation studies literature – provide a necessary 
precondition for future technological innovations.97 In this regard it is promising to see 
that companies aware of climate change – an awareness for which the EU ETS has been 
the main driver – introduce more low-carbon innovations than companies without such 
an awareness.98 In addition, Martin et al. (2012) show that managers aware of climate 
change tend to introduce firm-internal targets, e.g. regarding the reduction of green-
house gas emissions – something to which the EU ETS has been shown to contribute to, 
alongside other elements of the policy mix. These internal targets, in turn, have been 
shown to positively impact low-carbon innovation. As several of the studies reviewed in 
this chapter have shown it is indeed the EU ETS which has made managers more aware 
of climate change. However, the scheme currently does not provide sufficient incentives 
for turning corporate aspirations into lucrative business opportunities, something that 
needs to be urgently corrected if policy makers are taking the Paris Agreement serious-
ly.  
 
Indeed, it is the momentum of COP21 in December 2015 and the global agreement 
reached there to hold the global average temperature increase well below 2°C which 
provides European and national climate policy makers with the mandate to think crea-
tively how to find the political majorities to significantly increase the stringency of the 
EU ETS beyond what has been proposed by the European Commission for the fourth 
trading phase. As the studies surveyed in this review have shown this implies first and 
foremost increasing the scarcity of EUAs, thereby contributing to higher yet predictable 
carbon prices. The permanent retiring of EUAs parked in the market stability reserve, 
the further strengthening of the reduction factor, and the establishment of an intelligent 
mechanism which guarantees a minimum EUA price are three possible avenues for in-
creasing the so far limited innovation incentives generated by the EU ETS. Making the 
                                                     
96  See World Bank and Ecofys, ‘State and Trends of Carbon Pricing’ (2015). 
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EU ETS more stringent as outlined above would not only unleash its transformative 
power by generating greater incentives to invest in low-carbon innovation, but it would 
also send out a strong political signal that Europe takes the agreement struck in Paris 
seriously and implements it accordingly. It is exactly this line of thinking in terms of 
consistent and credible policy mixes made up of ambitious long-term targets which are 
implemented by a combination of well designed demand pull, technology push and sys-
temic instruments which is needed for successfully governing the decarbonization of the 
economy.99 
 
  
                                                     
99  See Karoline S Rogge and others, ‘Green Change : Renewable Energies , Policy Mix and 
Innovation’ (2015). 
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